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Girard - his strength and his weakness
MB. ter Borg (Leiden)
It is not hard to imagine that René Girard would find Mooij's paper very interesting and
helpful, not as a correction of some of his main ideas, but as a demonstration of their
correctness.
Girard went to great lengths to refute the romantic idea that, although the norms,
laws and language of a society may be social in character, one's emotions and desires are
at least one's own. This idea is an ideological distortion that may be found from Rousseau
to Freud and thereafter. What we do not know and what we do not want to see is, that
even our most personal desires are not our own. If a subject desires an object, there is
always a third, the model, that he wants to imitate.The subject desires something because
somebody else desires it He is bound to imitate others, because the object of his desires is
only partly in his DNA. This is where man differs from other animals. But the romantic
has chosen to deny this fact and to pretend that he is autonomous in his choices. The fact
of his mimesis is kept in the realm of the subconscious.
This, René Girard would argue, is demonstrated by Mooij. Mooij simply denies the
whole mechanism. Desire is not triangular he says, but dual: only a subject and an object
are involved. But what is the reason of this denial? Mooij does not give any substantial
arguments for his denial. Girard would say: 'Why should he reject my very plausible
theory ?' One is puzzled, until one realizes that Mooij himself is keeping unaware the fact
that he is following another model: Lacan, who is following Freud.
Of course, Girard himself is also mimetic. He never makes own discoveries, but
always rediscovers the discoveries of others, be it of great novelists such as Dostoievsky
or Proust, or be it from the gospels. So he is, just like Mooij, an illustration of his theory.
It is a theory of mimesis which itself is mimetic.
There is a second point where Girard would be glad to see his theory confirmed by
the way Mooij tries to reject it That is where the scapegoat comes in. Imitation also
affects violence, as we can see so well for instance, in Laurel and Hardy films. If
everybody follows everybody in being violent, a horrible situation comes into being,
where revenge is answered by revenge. This crisis exists until somebody is killed by
everyone, without being revenged. Then, a calm and salutary peace is showered on the
mass. They feel one and they bless the victim they just killed, because he made one
people out of the violent chaos they were before. The victim is sanctified. This is the
primeval lynching, le meurtre fondateur, that is to say the beginning of society and culture
with its taboos and rules and everything that Mooij at the end of his paper prefers to call
'the law'.
Now, whenever the mimetic crisis threatens to return, the people look for a new
victim. It normally has, according to Girard, four characteristics: it is different from others,
it is marginal, it has no one who is able to revenge it and it is considered guilty of a
fundamental crime like violating the incest-taboo. It will be the scapegoat and as such the
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focal point of aggression. According to Girard, the gospei undermines the social order,
based on this scapegoat mechanism. It demonstrates, in the person of Jesus Christ, that the
victim, the scapegoat, is innocent That is the message which time and again we attempt to
ignore.
Girard would say that Mooij demonstrates perfectly our wish to disregard the
innocence of the scapegoat. Mooij says that it is not innocent in so far as it reminds us of
the possibility of getting rid of the discontents of culture and thus undermines group
cohesion. So, for Mooij, being willy-nilly different is, in a way, being guilty.
Thus far, I have criticized Mooij, taking Girard as my model. But, as Girard says, every
mimetic relationship is ambivalent. The model is also a rival. Therefore, I will now
criticize Girard, taking Mooij as my model. I completely agree with Mooij, where he says
that mimesis, although an important characteristic of human behaviour, is not the only
one, and not even the most important one. Unfortunately, I cannot agree with all of his
arguments for this conclusion. Some of them do not seem adequate, and some of them are
not understandable for the simple sociologist of religion that I happen to be. The reason
for this, I think, is that Mooij is not criticizing Girard in his own right. In fact, he is
defending Freud and Lacan against Girard. But, whatever the value of these arguments
may be, let me add two others. From commenting I now turn to amending, and I expect
that my intentions do not differ too much from those of Mooij.
It always bothered me as a sociologist, that Girard, in developing a social theory,
never argued like a sociologist I think that I know what the reason is. Taking sociological
theory into consideration in a serious way would severely undermine the enormous
pretensions of the theory.1 will give two examples of this.
The first is, as a matter of fact an old one. Here, the mirror of Mooij returns. But
it is not a physical mirror, it is a social one. Since George Herben Mead we know that
mimesis is controlled by the reactions of others: I want to imitate the model, but the
reactions of both the model and the object, teach me who I am, how I should behave,
what I should desire and thus: how I should imitate the model. Due to these reactions, I
know my identity, my position and my chances. This is what is called 'the looking-glass
self. If I want to imitate my model, I must do it according to the possibilities I know I
have. Not every soldier has a Marshall's staff in his knapsack, and fortunately, he knows
it! Thus, imitations are hardly ever literal; they are almost always socially mediated. This
makes them less dangerous and less important Furthermore, if the subject is socially
constituted, as it is for a considerable part, this does not necessarily mean that it is in the
first place mimetic. My social identity depends at least as much from mirror-functions of
the others, as from mimesis.
The relativity of mimesis concerns its most important effect as well, and this is my
second example. The most important effect of mimesis is the initial murder, that is the
beginning of the social bond we call society. This, according to Girard, takes place when
the victim stands alone and is not revenged. So, before the initial murder there was
revenge. Revenge is not the same as mimetic violence. It presupposes very strong social
bonds. Why should I risk my life for someone with whom I have nothing to do? There are
no social bonds without rules, solidarity, mutual understanding and so on. That means that
the initial murder presupposes what it pretends to explain: the existence of group cohesion
in one way or another.
Let me now come to my conclusion. I think Girard has very important things to say. But
r
66 M£. ter Borg
unfortunately he seems to confuse ideal-type and reality. Thus, his ideal-typical ideas
receive an absolute status. They are no longer an aspect of reality, they become the
paramount reality and the key to the total understanding of that reality. Sometimes I have
the impression that Girard wants to be more than just a very brilliant scholar. As the first
scholar in nearly 2000 years to understand what the gospel really means, he wants to be a
guru, a model to be followed by everyone. That is his tragedy. From his own theory he
might have learned that modern people do not want to be identified as followers. They
want to seem to be autonomous subjects. Thus, they pass over those, who present
themselves too obviously as a model for others to follow. The result is that Girard's
insights are not taken as seriously as the should be.
